Rational planning and politicians' attitudes to spending and reform: replication and extension of a survey experiment

The rational planning cycle of formulating strategic goals and using performance information to assess implementation is assumed to assist decision-making by politicians. Empirical evidence for this assumption is, however, scarce. Our study replicates Nielsen and Baekgaard’s (2015) experiment on the relation between performance information and politicians’ attitudes to spending and reform and extends this experiment by investigating the role of strategic goals. Based on a randomized survey experiment with 1.484 Flemish city councilors and an analysis of 225 municipal strategic plans, we found that information on low and high performance as well as strategic goals directly impact decision-making by politicians

Institutional isomorphism, negativity bias and performance information use by politicians: A survey experiment

New Public Management popularized performance measurement in public organizations. Underlying performance measurement's popularity is the assumption that it injects performance information (PI) into decision-making, thus rationalizing the ensuing decisions. Despite its popularity, performance measurement is criticized. In part, this criticism results from the limited knowledge of the conditions under which PI is purposefully used by politicians. We conducted a survey experiment based on real PI with 1,240 politicians. We hypothesized that PI has a positive impact on performance information use (PIU) when PI is benchmarked with coercive, mimetic or normative pressures. Moreover, due to negativity bias we expected this positive impact to be stronger when PI signals low performance. We found that normative pressures had a positive impact on actual PIU while coercive pressures positively affected intended PIU. Negativity bias is only relevant when linked to coercive pressures and intended PIU for analysing the organization's finances

Performance Information in Politics: How Framing, Format, and Rhetoric Matter for Politicians’ Preferences

Performance information research has grown rapidly over the last decade with much research emphasizing the importance of how information is framed, presented, and communicated by using a distinct rhetorical appeal. In this study, we examine how the framing, format, and rhetoric of performance information influence preferences among elected politicians. We study the direct effects of how information is presented. We also argue that performance information is always a mixture of different frames, formats, and rhetorical appeals and that it is therefore important to account for interaction effects. Using a large-scale survey experiment with responses from 1,406 Italian local politicians, we find that framing and ethos-based rhetoric affect politicians’ responses to performance information. We also find that the format of presentation is important in several ways. Thus, politicians are more likely to support the status quo when information is presented graphically rather than textually, and a graphical format furthermore reduces the impact of ethos-based rhetoric and – to a lesser extent – the impact of equivalence framing

Corrigendum to "European Society for Vascular Surgery (ESVS) 2022 Clinical Practice Guidelines on the Management of Chronic Venous Disease of the Lower Limbs. [Eur J Vasc Endovasc Surg (2022) 63, 184-267]"

proofepub_ahead_of_prin

Editor's Choice – European Society for Vascular Surgery (ESVS) 2022 Clinical Practice Guidelines on the Management of Chronic Venous Disease of the Lower Limbs

Corrigendum: Volume 64, Issues 2–3, 2022, 284-285Peer reviewe

Replication Data for: The Role of Evidence in Politics: Motivated Reasoning and Persuasion among Politicians

Replication material for the aritcle entitled "The Role of Evidence in Politics: Motivated Reasoning and Persuasion among Politicians" accepted for publication in British Journal of Political Science January 2017

Equal access to the top? Representative bureaucracy and politicians' recruitment preferences for top administrative staff

Although a voluminous literature on representative bureaucracy and minority discrimination suggests that characteristics other than qualifications influence hiring decisions, little is known about whether this also pertains to the top positions in political-administrative organizations. To shed light on this question, we ask how candidate ethnicity, gender, and age affect the recruitment preferences among politicians regarding the candidates for top administrative positions. Our study uses a survey experiment with random assignment of 1,688 Flemish local politicians to one of eight different descriptions of applicants to the leading managerial position of their local authority. We find that ethnic minorities, women, and younger candidates are generally considered more qualified for the job. Moreover, the impact of ethnicity and gender on recruitment preferences is conditional on politicians' ideological predispositions: Left-wing politicians consider ethnic minority candidates more competent, whereas right-wing politicians consider them less representative and are less inclined to invite them for job interviews than candidates from the ethnic majority. Furthermore, politicians furthest to the left are more inclined than right-wing politicians to recognize women as representative of the public at large and support inviting them for job interviews

Rational planning and politicians’ preferences for spending and reform : replication and extension of a survey experiment

The rational planning cycle of formulating strategic goals and using performance information to assess goal implementation is assumed to assist decision-making by politicians. Empirical evidence supporting this assumption is scarce. Our study replicates a Danish experiment on the relation between performance information and politicians‘ preferences for spending and reform and extends this experiment by investigating the role of strategic goals. Based on a randomized survey experiment (1.484 Flemish city councillors) and an analysis of 225 strategic plans, we found that information on low and high performance as well as strategic goals impact politicians’ preferences for spending and reform

Institutional isomorphism, negativity bias and performance information use by politicians : a survey experiment

New Public Management popularized performance measurement (PM) in public organizations. Underlying PM’s popularity, is the assumption that it injects performance information (PI) into decision-making thus rationalizing the ensuing decisions. Despite PM’s popularity, it is criticized. In part, this criticism results from the limited knowledge on why PI is used by politicians. We conduct a survey experiment based on real PI with 1.210 politicians. We hypothesize that PI has a positive impact on performance information use (PIU) when PI is benchmarked with a coercive, mimetic or normative institutional pressure. Moreover, we expect this positive impact to be stronger when PI is negative. We find that coercive and normative pressures indeed have a positive impact on intended PIU but only normative pressures have a positive impact on actual PIU. Moreover, mimetic pressures have a positive impact on actual PIU but only when PI is negative. Implications for practice and theory are discussed

Replication data for "Performance Information in Politics: How Framing, Format, and Rhetoric Matter for Politicians’ Preferences"

Replication data and code for the article "Performance Information in Politics: How Framing, Format, and Rhetoric Matter for Politicians’ Preferences", accepted for publication in Journal of Behavioral Public Administration